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Berkeley & London, University of California Press, 2004, 215 p.
Gary D. Rawnsley
 “This only is denied to God : the power to change
the past”
Agathon
“Though God cannot alter the past, historians
can”
Samuel Butler 
1 I read China’s New Nationalism in one sitting having re-read Iris Chang’s Rape of Nanking
(Penguin, 1997) the day before. Although a coincidence, my timing was fortunate. Peter
Hays Gries’s superb survey of Chinese nationalism is an indispensable complement to
the  (not  always  fairly)  criticised  Chang.  Gries’s  discussion  of  Rape  of  Nanking helps
readers  to  put  the book in a context  that  is  based on the history of  Sino-Japanese
relations  and  what  appears  as  an  unyielding  struggle  for  status  in  Asia.  He  also
discusses the academic community’s disapproval of Chang, and rushes to her defence
by explaining : “Chang never claims to be a historian ; she is a sincere young woman
enraged  by  what  she  has  learned  about  the  atrocities  of  December  1937”  (p.  84).
However, instead of examining the details of the debate, Gries is more concerned with
how what he refers to as “the Rape of Nanking sensation” provided “an opportunity for a
public contest between Chinese and Japanese narratives of the past before a jury of
Western  opinion.  Thus,  two  projects  are  intertwined  in  victimization  narratives :
quantifying the pain and presenting the Chinese case to the world” (Ibid.). The book’s
research is driven by a desire to understand the origins of this narrative and explain
why the discourse of humiliation contributes to Chinese self-identity, identification of
“the other”, and ultimately the importance of nationalism in Chinese politics. This is a
very  recent  development :  Gries  reveals  that  the  discourse  of humiliation—the
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narrative  of  victimization—challenges  the  heroic  “victor  narrative”  of  history  that
dominated the first three decades of post-revolutionary China. 
2 The aim of the book is deceptively simple : to offer readers an opportunity to engage
with  the  usually  neglected  Chinese  perspective  on  Japan  and  America  and  their
relations with the Middle  Kingdom. By careful  research in multiple  Chinese media,
Gries realises his goal through the prism of nationalism, here defined as the ideology of
the fourth generation leadership. China’s nationalism, like its practice of socialism, is
far from doctrinaire. Rather, China’s nationalism is essentially pragmatic and evolves
through  interaction  with  the  international  community.  As  Gries  reminds  us,  the
making  of  foreign  policy  does  not  occur  in  a  vacuum,  but  is  constrained  by  the
behaviour, interests and ambitions of other actors in the international system. Gries’s
most significant contribution is in recognising that the Chinese people themselves are
gradually asserting their power, using the nationalist discourse as a way of expressing
their own ideas and emotions to the Chinese leadership and the outside world. He is
critical that the west has too often regarded structures of political power as the sole
authorities  that  can  define  Chinese  nationalism  and  determine  how  it  might  be
expressed.  To prove this  novel  idea,  Gries carefully analyses public  reaction to two
critical  events  of  the  past  five  years :  the  1999  American  bombing  of  the  Chinese
embassy in Belgrade, and the collision of an American spy plane and a Chinese air-force
fighter in 2001. His conclusion is persuasive : that the eruption of popular nationalism
among Chinese around the world that so enraged the Americans was not engineered by
the leadership in Beijing, but were the spontaneous outpouring of anger. “The Western
press’s insistence that a diabolical Communist elite manipulated the Chinese protestors
tells us more about ourselves than about what actually happened in May 1999” (p. 133).
Gries argues that contrary to Western opinion, the Chinese authorities feared these
outbursts because they epitomised the Communist Party’s gradual loss of control over
nationalist discourse.
3  Less convincing is the following claim : “The Chinese people are demanding a say in
nationalist politics : the fate of the nation is no longer the Party’s exclusive dominion.
Western policymakers should also recognize that because the party’s legitimacy now
depends upon accommodating popular nationalist demands, the Foreign Ministry must
take popular opinion into account as  it  negotiates  foreign policy” (p.  20).  This  is  a
rather bold claim. We can accept that the anti-American rhetoric suggests a renewed
popular  activism  that  is  embedded  in  nationalism,  and  there  is  evidence  that  the
Chinese political elite were forced to respond to this nationalist mood. However, this
does not prove that public opinion now plays an important role in formulating and
conducting foreign policy, and Gries needs to provide more evidence to support this
claim. 
4 Most engaging are Gries’s insights into Chinese “face”, though he is careful to impress
upon his readers that “face” is a universal, rather than oriental concept. The discussion
takes some surprising turns.  Gries reveals  that the Chinese were unconcerned with
Samuel  Huntington’s  bizarre  argument  that  the  world  is  facing  a  “Clash  of
Civilizations”. (Gries is not alone in believing that “Neither the structure of the world
system nor the cultural differences between China and America make conflict between
China and the United States inevitable” (p. 140). The same also applies to Islam, rarely
separated from Al-Qaida and too often treated as a homogenous civilisation). Instead,
the  Chinese  were  delighted  that  the  West  had  finally  recognised  that  their  status
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deserved elevating, even if it meant they were now perceived as a substantial threat to
world peace.  Similarly,  Gries contrasts the enduring Chinese love affair  with Henry
Kissinger and their suspicion of Richard Nixon. Kissinger is courted as an intellectual
equal  to  the  Chinese  (though,  ever  the  fawning diplomat,  Kissinger  claims Mao an
intellectual superior). In contrast, Nixon is admonished as weak because he was forced
to open relations with China supposedly against his will : “Because face is a zero-sum
game, China’s win [in entering the UN in 1971] must be America’s loss, and American
humiliation at defeat must be represented by Nixon’s red-face fury” (p. 63). We can
argue  over  the  historic  detail,  and  there  is  every  reason  to  challenge  the  Chinese
interpretation of these events : what is important is that, right or wrong, “Dissing Dick”
and  “Hugging  Henry”  are  part  of  a  Chinese  narrative  that  has  been  carefully
constructed to reinforce “face” and restore nationalist pride in the Middle Kingdom.
5 However, the Chinese reserve the full force of their national venom for the Japanese.
Anyone  familiar  with  Chinese  history  is  aware  of  the  bitterness  that  continues  to
underlie Sino-Japanese relations. (In Wu Nian-zhen’s film, Buddha Blessed America, set in
1960s Taiwan, one of the main characters played by Lin Zheng-sheng casually dismisses
the Japanese by saying they are not really Asian anyway.) China’s defeat in the Jaiwu
war, resulting in the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), was more a humiliation than the
Opium Wars because “little brother” Japan had beaten “big brother” China : “The loss
of national face was even worse than defeat itself. Because Japan is depicted as having
caused the public loss of national face, anger directed against Japan thus assumes a
moral legitimacy and is not just a base desire for revenge” (p.72). The Rape of Nanking
(itself a symbolic term), and perhaps more importantly, Chinese discourse about the
events of 1937 (and about comfort women, the need for Japanese remuneration, the
demand that Tokyo issue an official apology for the atrocities committed in China, etc.),
further fuelled Sino-Japanese antagonism and helped to define Chinese in relation to
“the other”. Clearly, history, the interpretation and re-invention of the past, can have
an enduring effect on the national soul ; the Chinese have a particularly long history on
which to draw. 
6 China’s  New  Nationalism is  a  readable  analysis  of  a  very  important  issue  in  Chinese
politics with far reaching potential consequences for the future of the political system.
By reminding us that the way we see ourselves and others does matter in international
relations, Peter Hays Gries has made an invaluable contribution to the scholarship on
Chinese identity, nationalism and foreign policy.
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